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Abstract 
The out-of-sample forecasting performance of traditional stock return models (dividend 
yield, t-bill rate, etc.) is compared with the forecasting performance of the Livingston survey. 
The results suggest that the survey forecasts are much like a "too large" forecasting model: 
poor performance and too sensitive to irrelevant information. 
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G12 1 Introduction
This paper studies two aspects of the Livingston survey on predicted equity prices: could
this panel of economists predict price changes—and did they believe they could?
Return predictability is one of the most contested areas in ﬁnancial economics. Re-
cently, Goyal and Welch (2004) argue that the evidence of predictability of equity re-
turns disappears when out-of-sample forecasts are considered. In a reply, Campbell and
Thompson (2005) claim that there is still some out-of-sample predictability, provided we
put reasonable restrictions on the estimated models.
The contribution of this paper is to study the forecasting performance of the Liv-
ingston survey. While this has been done several times before (see, for instance, Dokko
and Edelstein (1989), Bondt (1991) and Pearce (1984)), this paper updates the evidence,
relates the ﬁndings to the new literature of out-of-sample forecasting and investigates also
other (than the forecasting performance) properties of the forecasts.
It is found that the the survey forecasts perform worse than a naive forecast (the his-
torical mean) and that they share many properties with “too large” prediction models—in
particular oversensitivity to recent data.
2 Data
Most of the data used in this paper are standard: various S&P indices, inﬂation rates,
t-bill rates and dates of NBER recessions. See Appendix A for details. The survey data
on predicted future stock index values is somewhat less known, so this section is devoted
to presenting and discussing it.
The Livingston semi-annual survey collects forecasts of economists in industry, gov-
ernment, banking and academia. It was started in 1946 by the ﬁnancial columnist Joseph
Livingston, but since 1990 it has been administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia.
Since June 1952 the survey has asked about the predicted Standard & Poor (S&P)
index level 6 and 12 months ahead in time: from June 1952 to June 1990 the survey asked
about the S&P Industrials index, and from December 1990 and onwards it asked about
the S&P 500 Composite. For further details, see Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
(2004) and Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2005).
3This is a very interesting data set: it gives a long time series of predictions from a
group of well informed economists. However, there are several issues of how to use the
data.
First, whiletheLivingstondatabasecontainsinformationonindividualanswers, these
series are typically too short to be useful for assessing the forecasting performance: some
sort of pooling is necessary. I choose to use the median forecasts, that is, for each time
period I ﬁnd the median across the forecasters. (The median is preferred to the mean since
it is less sensitive to outliers.) This provides a long data series, but it is likely to exaggerate
the forecasting performance of a representative survey respondent.1 The results should
therefore be thought of as a (crude) upper boundary of the forecasting performance.
Second, it is actually fairly tricky to calculate implied expected capital gains from the
survey data. (Expected capital gains are all we can hope for since the survey only asks
about future index levels, not dividends.) The June and December surveys are sent out
in late May and November respectively, and contain “base values” of the stock index,
typically from mid May/November. The June survey asks for the index levels at the end
of December the same year and June next year; the December survey asks for the index
levels at the end of June and December next year. It would seem to be straightforward to
calculate an expected capital gain by dividing the expected future level by the base value.
Unfortunately, some of the base values are highly unreliable.2
An alternative approach (used by Pearce (1984)) is to replace the base value with the
index level from the last day of the month before the survey. However, it is unclear if the
respondents had access to the end-of-month values when ﬁlling out the forms. There are
also indications that the predictions in December 1989 and June 1990 are for the S&P 500
rather than the S&P Industrials.3
In practice, the time series pattern on the expected gains is sensitive to this choice—
and both alternatives produce some strange expected capital gains.4 I will therefore com-
1There is good theoretical and empirical evidence that combining (averaging) forecasts typically reduces
the forecast error variance (see, for instance, Bates and Granger (1969), Winkler and Makridakis (1983) and
Batchelor and Dua (1995)).
2Consider the following two examples. First, the base value for the Dec 1999 survey is 1229.23, while
the S&P 500 index was never below 1350 during Nov to mid Dec. Similarly, the base value for the Dec
2000 survey is 1429.40, which is the index value on 31 Oct 2000, whereas the 30 Nov value is 1314.95.
3The base values are 339 and 354 respectively, which corresponds well to the S&P values in mid Nov
1989 and May 1990. The predictions are for virtually unchanged levels. In contrast, the S&P Industrials
was around 400 during this period.
4The evidence of average over- or under-prediction is not much affected by the choice of base value,
4bine the 6- and 12-month forecasts to calculate an implied expected growth rate over a
6-month horizon starting 6 months from now (as in Dokko and Edelstein (1989)). This
avoids the problem with the base level, and also the potential change of the index in late
1989 (provided we are willing to assume that the respondents had the same beliefs about
capital gains on the S&P Industrials and S&P 500).













Figure 1: Expected and ex post capital gains on the combined S&P index in excess of a
riskfree rate, %. This ﬁgure shows the expected and ex post capital gains (in excess of a riskfree rate) for
the 6-month horizon. The survey forecasts were made 12 months earlier. The data is for the S&P Industrials
for the period up to June 1990, and the S&P 500 after that.
In the rest of the paper, I use these expected capital gains over a 6-month horizon,
starting (approximately) 6 months from the survey date. I form one series of expectations
by using the S&P Industrials for the early period (June 1952 to June 1990) and the S&P
500 for the late period (since December 1990)—and a similar series for the ex post capital
gains. Figure 1 shows these series: the ex post capital gains together with the survey
predictions made 12 months earlier. As expected, the ex post data is much more volatile.
It also seems as if the forecast performance is mixed.
3 Forecasting Performance
This section reports the forecasting performance of simple regression models (in-sample
and out-of-sample) and of the Livingston survey.
however.
5The ﬁrst column of Table 1 summarises the in-sample predictability from using pre-
diction equations—in terms of the traditional R2. For instance, the ﬁrst number says that
using only the dividend yield as predictor gives an R2 of around 2%. The other variables
(returns, t-bill rate, the historical mean return calculated on a sample from 1926 to the
month before the return, an indicator of NBER recessions and the inﬂation rate) are all
worse. Using all these predictors at the same time gives a pretty impressive R2 of 11%.
(To avoid confusion, please notice that the historical mean is here used as a predictor in a
regression equation, so the forecast is not the same as the historical mean.)
In-sample Out-of-sample Out-of-sample
Regression with the following predictor:
Dividend yield 2:2  11:1 0:4
Returns 0:2 0:1 0:3
T-bill rate 0:7  4:5 1:2
Historical mean 0:6 0:3 0:3
Recession 1:6  0:3  0:3
Inﬂation 1:3 0:3 0:3




Table 1: R2 from forecasting 6-month excess capital gains with different predictors, %. The
table shows results for the 6-month horizon starting 6 months ahead in time. The out-of-sample R2 is
relative to the historical mean. The out-of-sample restricts all predictions to be non-negative. See Figure
1 for details on the data.
The second column of Table 1 shows the out-of-sample evidence—in terms of the
out-of-sample R2 (as in Campbell and Thompson (2005)). This measure compares the
mean squared error of the prediction model and from using historical average return as
the forecast.5 To calculate the out-of-sample forecasts, the prediction model is estimated
on the sample from 1926:1 to period t, and the observed predictor in t is then used to
generate a forecast for the 6-month period starting 6 months after period t (just like the
5The “out-of-sample R2” in Campbell and Thompson (2005) is R2
OS D 1  
PT
tDs .rt   O rt/
2 =
PT
tDs .rt   N rt/
2, where s is the ﬁrst period with an out-of-sample forecast, rt is
the return in t, O rt is the model forecast of the return in t and N rt is the average return for the sample from 1
to t   1.
6survey). This is repeated for all June and December months from 1952 to 2005. The
historical mean is estimated in a similar recursive way.
The results in the second column of Table 1 indicate very little out-of-sample pre-
dictability: several variables (including the dividend yield) perform much worse than the
historical mean—and the model using all predictors is worst. The latter is a common
ﬁnding in the forecasting literature: large models often suffer from in-sample overﬁtting
and will therefore have poor out-of-sample performance.
The third column of Table 1 also shows out-of-sample evidence, but where the pre-
dictions are replaced by zero if they are negative (similat to Campbell and Thompson
(2005)).6 This improves the performance quite a bit: most predictors get slightly positive
R2 values, but the large model (using all predictors) is still very poor: the R2 is  6:5%.
The last two lines of Table 1 reports the out-of-sample R2 for a zero forecast and the
Livingston survey forecasts. Interestingly, In contrast, always predicting a zero capital
gain is not such a terrible idea since the R2 is  1:3%, but the survey is really poor: the R2
is almost  8% which is even worse than the large model with non-negative predictions.7
Similarly, a classical test of forecast unbiasedness (regressing the ex post values on a
constant and the forecasts, not shown in the table) gives an annualised intercept around
3:5% and a slope coefﬁcient of  0:1. They are signiﬁcantly (at the 5% level) different
from 0 and 1 respectively. This means that the survey forecasts underestimated the aver-
age ex post capital gain and moved in the wrong direction.8
To summarise, the Livingston survey is a much worse forecaster (out-of-sample) than
the most common one-variable prediction equations—the performance is as bad as a typ-
ical “too large” forecasting model. Since I am using the median forecast from the survey,
this should be considered as an upper boundary of the forecasting performance of a ran-
domly picked survey participant.9
Figure2illustratesthetimeproﬁleoftheout-of-samplepredictability. Theﬁgureplots
the out-of-sample R2 calculated since 1952: the ﬁrst sample is for 1952–1961 and the last
is for 1952–2005 and therefore coincides with the second column in Table 1. Most of the
6Other non-linear restrictions, for instance, using the max of the prediction and the negative of the recent
dividend yield, give similar results.
7This is similar to the results in Bondt (1991), who ﬁnds that professional forecasters have virtually zero
forecasting performance.
8This stands in contrast to the ﬁndings by Dokko and Edelstein (1989).
9In contrast, much evidence shows that the Livingston survey performs well in forecasting macro vari-
































































Figure 2: Recursive out-of-sample R2 from forecasting 6-month excess capital gains with
different models, %. This ﬁgure shows the out-of-sample R2 for samples that start in 1952 and end in
the period marked on the horisontal axis. The ﬁrst sample is for 1952-1961.12 and the last sample is for
1952–2005.12.
variables have a fairly even performance over time, but the dividend yield only worked
well in the early 1970s (as shown by a positive slope of the curve). Predicting zero seems
to have been a terrible idea during the 1950s, but a good one 1965–1975, and as good
as using the historical mean thereafter. The survey forecasts were poor for most of the
period, except the late 1960s to 1980.
The general impression from Figure 2 is that the evidence of weak forecasting perfor-
mance reported earlier is fairly robust across subsamples.
4 Characterising the Survey Forecasts
This section studies the relation between the survey forecasts and traditional predictors.
8Figure 3 shows the survey predictions and the NBER recessions (marked by shaded
areas). The Livingston forecasters clearly did not believe in the random walk hypothesis:
there are distinct movements in the expected capital gains. In particular, the expectations
have local maxima in almost all recessions, which suggests a belief in a medium term
mean reversion.10 (Recall that the forecasts are for the 6 months starting 6 months ahead
in time.)






Figure 3: Expected excess capital gains on the combined S&P index, %. This ﬁgure shows
the survey predictions of the capital gains on the S&P index (in excess of a riskfree rate) for the 6-month
horizon starting 6 months ahead in time and the NBER recessions (shaded areas).
Indeed, Table 2 shows that the correlation of expected capital gains (over month 7-
12) with current ex post returns (over the last 6 months) is negative, and the correlation
with a dummy variable for the NBER recessions is strongly positive. Interestingly, the
forecasts have a negative correlation with dividend yields and a positive correlation with
inﬂation—in contrast to the ex post capital gains.
The main point, however, is that the survey forecasts are strongly related to the pre-
dictors. For instance, in Table 2 most of the correlations with the survey forecasts are
signiﬁcant at the 5% level (none of the correlations with the ex post capital gains are),
and regressing the survey forecasts on all the predictors gives an R2 of almost 50%. This
strengthens the impression from the analysis of the forecast performance: it seems as if
the survey forecasts are similar to a “too large” forecasting model. This means that the
10The NBER recessions are declared after a long period (for instance, the November 2001 trough was
declared only in July 2003), but they still serve as reasonable proxy for the perceived (in real-time) state of
the business cycle.
9forecasters use “models” that suffer from overﬁtting and recency bias.11
Ex post Survey forecasts
Dividend yield 14:8  20:7
Returns  4:9  17:1
T-bill rate  8:6  21:2
Historical mean  7:6  7:1
Recession 12:6 30:2
Inﬂation  11:2 21:4
Table 2: Correlations of ex post and predicted 6-month excess capital gains with different
predictors, %. The table shows results for the 6-month horizon starting 6 months ahead in time. See
Figure 1 for details on the data.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the forecasts of equity price changes in the Livingston survey for the
sample from 1952 to 2005. The results indicate that the survey forecasts perform clearly
worse than the historical mean (estimated on a recursive sample), and that they share
many properties with “too large” prediction models.
There are two implications of this ﬁnding. First, if this group of forecasters cannot
predict stock price changes, should we then really pay any attention to the small set of
(carefully selected) regressions that can? Maybe they are just type 1 errors. If so, portfolio
recommendations should not rely on predictability. Second, it still seems as if these fore-
castersthoughttheycouldpredictpricechanges: theexpectationsvarymarkedly—andare
strongly correlated with traditional predictors. Maybe studies (as opposed to recommen-
dations) of portfolio choice and asset pricing should incorporate beliefs on time-varying
expected stock price movements.
A Data Appendix
The data of the Livingston Survey is from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
(http://www.phil.frb.org/).
11See Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Bondt and Thaler (1990) for studies of recency bias.
10The monthly S&P 500 and S&P Industrials price indices are from S&P’s Trade and
Securities Statistics (1976) and Compustat. The dividends on the S&P 500 and the inﬂa-
tion rate are from Shiller’s homepage (http://www.econ.yale.edu/%7Eshiller/data.htm),
see Shiller (2000). For a discussion of the historical S&P series, see Jones and Wilson
(2002).
The 3-month T-bill rate is from FRED II (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/).
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